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We investigate a model of stratified economic interactions between agents when the notion of
spatial location is introduced. The agents are placed on a network with near-neighbor connections.
Interactions between neighbors can occur only if the difference in their wealth is less than a threshold
value that defines the width of the economic classes. By employing concepts from spatiotemporal
dynamical systems, three types of patterns can be identified in the system as parameters are varied:
laminar, intermittent and turbulent states. The transition from the laminar state to the turbulent
state is characterized by the activity of the system, a quantity that measures the average exchange
of wealth over long times. The degree of inequality in the wealth distribution for different parameter
values is characterized by the Gini coefficient. High levels of activity are associated to low values of
the Gini coefficient. It is found that the topological properties of the network have little effect on
the activity of the system, but the Gini coefficient increases when the clustering coefficient of the
network is increased.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Social stratification refers to the classification of in-
dividuals into groups or classes based on shared socio-
economic or power conditions within a society [1]. A
characteristic feature of stratified societies is that individ-
uals tend to interact more strongly with others in their
own group. This tendency has been observed in class
endogamy [2], scientific communities and citations [3],
population biology [4], human capital [5], opinion forma-
tion [6], epidemic dynamics [7], and economic exchanges
between banks [8]. Recently, the effects of social strati-
fication on the wealth distribution of a system of inter-
acting economic agents have been studied [9]. In this
model, agents behave as particles in a gas and they can
interact with each other at random, as in most mod-
els that have been proposed for economic exchange [10–
12]. However, many real social and economic systems
can be described as complex networks, such as small-
world networks and scale-free networks [13–15]. Some
models have considered economic dynamics on networks;
for example, Refs. [16] and [17] studied the effects of the
network topology on wealth distributions; while Ref. [18]
proposed a model of closed market on a fixed network
with free flow of goods and money.
In this paper, we study the effects of the topology of
a network on the collective behavior of a system subject
to stratified economic exchanges. Our model, based on
the interaction dynamics in a stratified society proposed
by Laguna et al. [9], is presented in Sec. 2. The inclu-
sion of a spatial support allows to employ concepts from
the dynamics of spatiotemporal systems in economic sys-
tems. Our results indicate that the size of the local neigh-
borhood plays an important role for achieving an equi-
table distribution of wealth in systems possessing strat-
ified economic exchange. Conclusions are presented in
Sec. 3.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a network defined by following the algo-
rithm of construction of small-world networks originally
proposed by Watts and Strogatz [13]. We start from a
regular ring with N nodes, where each node is connected
to its k nearest neighbors, k being an even number. Then,
each connection is rewired at random with probability p
to any other node in the network. After the rewiring
process, the number of elements coupled to each node –
which we call neighbors of that node – may vary, but the
total number of links in the network is constant and equal
to Nk/2. The condition logN ≤ k ≤ N is employed to
ensure that no node is isolated after the rewiring process,
which results in a connected graph. For p = 0, the net-
work corresponds to a regular ring, while for p = 1 the
resulting network is completely random. With this algo-
rithm, a small-world network is formed for values of the
probability in the intermediate range [13]. A small-world
network is characterized by a high degree of clustering,
as in a regular lattice, and a small characteristic path
length compared to the size of the system.
We consider a population of N interacting agents
placed at the nodes of this network. At a discrete time
t, an agent i (i = 1, . . . , N), is characterized by a wealth
wi(t) ≥ 0 and a fixed risk aversion factor βi, where
the values βi are randomly and uniformly distributed
in the interval [0, 1]. The quantity (1 − βi) measures
the fraction of wealth that agent i is willing to risk in
an economic interaction [11, 19, 20]. The initial values
wi(0) are uniformly distributed at random in the interval
2wi(0) ∈ [0,W ]. We assume that the total wealth of the
system, WT =
∑
i wt(i), is conserved.
For simplicity, we assume that the stratification of eco-
nomic classes is uniform, i.e., all classes have the same
width, denoted by a parameter u. Thus, agents i and j
belong to the same economic class if they satisfy the con-
dition |wi(t) − wj(t)| < u. Stratified economic exchange
means that only agents belonging to the same economic
class may interact. As a consequence of these interac-
tions, the wealth of the agents in the system will change.
At each time step t, the dynamics of the system is defined
by iterating the following steps:
1. Choose an agent i at random.
2. Choose randomly an agent j 6= i from the set of
neighbors of agent i, i.e., j ∈ [i− k/2, i+ k/2].
3. Check if they belong to the same economic class,
i.e.,
|wi(t)− wj(t)| < u. (1)
Repeat steps (1) and (2) until condition (3) is
achieved.
4. Compute the amount of wealth ∆w(t) to be ex-
changed between agents i and j, defined as
∆w(t) = min[(1 − βi)wi(t); (1− βj)wj(t)]. (2)
5. Calculate the probability r of favoring the agent
that has less wealth between i and j at time t, de-
fined as [9, 20]
r =
1
2
+ f ×
|wi(t)− wj(t)|
wi(t) + wj(t)
, (3)
where the parameter f ∈ [0, 1/2].
6. Assign the quantity ∆w(t) with probability r to
the agent having less wealth and with probability
(1− r) to the agent with greater wealth between i
and j.
The parameter f describes the probability of favoring
the poorer of the two agents when they interact. For
f = 0 both agents have equal probability of receiving
the amount ∆w(t) in the exchange, while for f = 1/2
the agent with less wealth has the highest probability
of receiving this amount. In a typical simulation follow-
ing these dynamical rules, and after a transient time,
this dynamical network reaches a stationary state where
the total wealth WT has been redistributed between the
agents.
The spatial localization of the interacting economic
agents allows to see this system as a spatiotemporal dy-
namical system. Figure 1 shows the spatiotemporal pat-
terns of wealth arising in a network with k = 2 and p = 0,
corresponding to a regular one-dimensional lattice with
periodic boundary conditions, for different values of the
parameters. In analogy to many nonlinear spatiotem-
poral dynamical systems [21], this network of economic
agents can exhibit three basic states depending on pa-
rameter values: a stationary, coherent or laminar state
(left panel), where the wealth of each agent i maintains
a constant value; an intermittent state (center panel),
characterized by the coexistence of coherent and irregu-
lar domains evolving in space and time; and a turbulent
state (right panel) where the wealth values change irreg-
ularly in both space and time.
FIG. 1: Spatiotemporal patterns in a one-dimensional lattice
with k = 2, size N = 50 and W = 1, after discarding 5000
time steps. The vertical axis describes the ordered position
i of the agents in the lattice, increasing from bottom to top.
Horizontal axis represents time, increasing from left to right.
The wealths wi(t) evolving in time are represented by a color
code. The color palette goes from light gray (the poorest
agent) to dark gray (the richest agent). Top: laminar state;
u = 10, f = 0.001. Center: spatiotemporal intermittent state;
u = 3, f = 0.4. Bottom: turbulent state; u = 30, f = 0.4.
3To characterize the transition from the laminar to the
turbulent state, via spatiotemporal intermittency, we em-
ploy the average wealth exchange for long times, a quan-
tity that we call the activity of the system and define
as
A =
1
T − τ
T∑
t=τ
∆w(t), (4)
where τ is a transient number of steps that are discarded
before taking the average. The laminar phase is associ-
ated to values A = 0, where no transactions take place
in the asymptotic state of system, while the turbulent
phase is characterized by A > 0.
FIG. 2: (a) Activity as a function of u in a regular lattice
(p = 0) with fixed k = 4, for different values of f . The curves
correspond to f = 0.5 (diamonds); f = 0.3 (circles); and
f = 0.1 (squares).(b) Activity as a function of f in a regular
lattice with k = 4, for u = 1 (squares), and u = 30 (circles).
In our calculations, we have fixed these values of pa-
rameters: size N = 104, τ = 108, T = 2 × 104, and
W = 1. Each value of the statistical quantities shown has
been averaged over 100 realizations of initial conditions.
Figure 2(a) shows the activity in the system as a func-
tion of the width of the economic classes u for different
values of the parameter f . The transition from the lam-
inar phase to the turbulent state occurs about the value
u ≈ W = 1 in all cases. When the value of the width u
reaches the value of the maximum initial wealth of the
agents, exchanges may take place in every neighborhood,
and this is reflected in the increase in the activity in the
system. For u > W , interactions continue to occur in the
entire system and the total wealth exchanged reaches the
maximum amount allowed by the favoring parameter f .
Thus, the activity in the system reaches an almost con-
stant value in this region, for a given value of f . On the
other hand, Figure 2(b) shows the activity in the system
as function of f . The increment in f enhances the trans-
fer of wealth from richer to poorer agents. Therefore, the
probability that neighboring agents belong to the same
economic class increases, and so does the probability that
they exchange wealth. As a consequence, the activity in
the system increases with increasing f .
FIG. 3: (a) Activity as a function of k, on a regular lattice
with p = 0, fixed f = 0.5, and for different values u = 1
(squares) and u = 10 (circles). (b) Activity as a function of
p, on a network with k = 4, and for different values f = 0.5
(triangles), f = 0.3 (circles) and f = 0.1 (squares).
To explore the effects of the network topology on the
collective properties of the system, we show in Figure 3(a)
the activity as a function of the size of the neighborhood
k in the network, for different values of u. The range of
the local interaction, given by k, has little effect on the
activity. Similarly, Figure 3(b) shows the activity as a
function of the rewiring probability in the network, for
fixed k = 4. We see that the exchange activity in the
system is practically unaffected by the topological prop-
erties of the network, represented by k and p. Thus, the
parameters of the dynamics, f and u, are more relevant
for the increase in the activity in the system than the
4topological parameters of the underlying network.
An important variable in economic dynamics is the
Gini coefficient, a statistical quantity that measures the
degree of inequality in the wealth distribution in a sys-
tem, defined as [22]
G(t) =
1
2N
∑N
i,j=1 |wi(t)− wj(t)|∑N
i=1 wi(t)
. (5)
A perfectly equitable distribution of wealth at time t,
where wi(t) = wj(t), ∀i, j, yields a value G(t) = 0. The
other extreme, where one agent has the total wealth∑N
i=1 wi(t), corresponds to a value G(t) = 1. The ran-
dom, uniform distribution of wealth used as initial con-
dition has G(0) ≈ 0, and the average initial wealth per
agent is wi(0) = 0.5. Figure 4(a) shows the asymptotic,
statistically stationary Gini coefficient as a function of
the width of the social classes u, for different values of
the parameter f .
FIG. 4: Gini coefficient at t = 108 as a function of u with
fixed k = 4 for different f . The curves correspond to f = 0.5
(circles); f = 0.3 (squares); and f = 0.1 (triangles). (b) Gini
coefficient at t = 108 as a function of parameter f for different
values of k and fixed u = 30. The curves correspond to k = 2
(squares); k = 4 (circles); and k = N − 1 (triangles).
For small values of u, there is a small probability of
interaction between neighbors, and therefore the initial
random, uniform distribution of wealth with G ≈ 0 is
maintained in the system, manifested in a low value of
G. As u increases, the transfer of wealth between neigh-
bors also increases, producing a redistribution of wealth
reflected in the increase of the the Gini coefficient. A
maximum of G occurs around u ≈ W = 1, when each
agent can initially interact with his neighbors, and there-
fore a greater variation with respect to the initial uniform
distribution of wealth occurs in the system. For larger
values of u, all local interactions are allowed initially. In
this regime, a redistribution of wealth should occur as
the probability f of favoring the poorest agents is incre-
mented. This can be seen in Figure 4(a) as a decrease in
the values of G, for u > W , as f increases. Figure 4(b)
shows the Gini coefficient as a function of the probability
f , for different sizes of the neighborhood k. The values
of G are almost constant for small values of f , but they
decrease for larger values of f .
FIG. 5: (a) Gini coefficient at t = 108 as a function of k on
a regular lattice with p = 0, for f = 0.1, u = 1 (squares) and
u = 10 (circles). (b) Gini coefficient at t = 108 as a function
of the rewiring probability p on a network with k = 4, with
fixed u = 10 and f = 0.5 (diamonds), f = 0.3 (circles), and
f = 0.1 (squares).
In order to study the influence of the topology of the
network on the distribution of wealth, Figure 5(a) dis-
plays G as a function of k, on a regular lattice with
p = 0, for different values of u. Increasing the number of
neighbors k contributes to an increase in the inequality
of the wealth distribution, as measured by G. Note that
G tends to an asymptotic, large value as k → N − 1,
corresponding to a fully connected network, i. e., any
5agent can interact with each other in the system, losing
the notion of spatial location. This corresponds to the
most commonly studied situations in models of economic
exchange [9].
Increasing the spatial range of the interactions, repre-
sented by k, implies both an increment in the cluster-
ing coefficient and a decrease in the characteristic path
length of the network. To see which of these two topologi-
cal properties of the network is more relevant for the vari-
ation of the Gini coefficient observed in Figure 5(a), we
plot in Figure 5(b) G as a function of the rewiring prob-
ability p, for different values of the parameter f . Note
that there is little change in the values ofG as p increases,
in comparison to the larger variation experienced by G
when k is augmented in Figure 5(a). The characteristic
path length in the network decreases in both cases, but
the clustering coefficient does not increases on the range
of values of p shown in Figure 5(b) [13]. Thus, the incre-
ment in the Gini coefficient observed in Figure 5(a) can
be mainly attributed to the increase in the clustering co-
efficient of the network when k is varied. In other words,
the size of the neighborhood is more relevant for the oc-
currence of an equitable distribution of wealth than the
presence of long range connections in a system subject to
a stratified economic exchange.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The inclusion of a network or a spatial location for in-
teracting economic agents allows the use of concepts from
spatiotemporal dynamical systems in economic models.
We have considered a model of stratified economic ex-
change defined on a network and have shown that dif-
ferent spatiotemporal patterns can occur as the param-
eters of the system are varied. We have characterized
these patterns as laminar, intermittent and turbulent,
employing analogies from spatiotemporal dynamical sys-
tems. We have characterized the transition from a lam-
inar state to a turbulent state through the activity of
the system, that measures the average wealth exchanged
in the asymptotic regime of the system. This quantity
depends mainly on the dynamical parameters u and f .
Similarly, the Gini coefficient, that characterizes the in-
equality in the distribution of wealth, depends on the
parameters u and f . For large values of u, increasing f
increases the activity but decreases the Gini coefficient.
Thus, high levels of economic exchange activity are asso-
ciated to low values of the Gini coefficient, i.e., to more
equitable distributions of wealth in the system.
The topology of the underlying network has little ef-
fect on the activity of the system A. In contrast, the
Gini coefficient G increases when the range of the inter-
actions, represented by k, is increased. We have shown
that the relevant topological property of the network that
influences the behavior of G, is the clustering coefficient,
instead of the characteristic path length of the network.
Figure 5 shows that a reduction of the Gini coefficient
in a system subject to a dynamics of stratified economic
exchange may be achieved by reducing the size of the
neighborhood of the interacting agents.
Our results add support to the view of local interac-
tions as a relevant ingredient that can have important
consequences in the collective behavior of economic mod-
els.
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